Firgun Ventures Insight
How Telecom Operators Can Capture Value From Quantum's Connective Layer
Zeynep Koruturk, Dr. Kris Naudts, and Donald Harmitt
The early internet rewarded the companies that controlled the networks, standards, and services that connected computers, as well as the firms building the machines themselves. For a stretch of the year 2000, the most valuable company in the world was Cisco, which sold the routers and switches that carried the traffic. Quantum computing companies resemble the chip, server and cloud providers of that era. Networking and security companies supply the equipment and protection around them. Telecom operators have a lucrative advantage, sitting where the backbone providers of the early internet once sat, holding infrastructure, expertise and customer relationships that a quantum company cannot inexpensively reproduce. The analogy is imperfect, but it shows telecoms operators have the opportunity to capture real value without ever building a quantum computer.
Quantum arrives at operators from both directions. Machines capable of breaking the cryptography that protects their networks would force them to replace those locks, even as the same technology promises better-run networks and new services to sell. Three roles follow from that conflict. The telecoms operator is a target protecting an enormous installed estate, a vendor selling the expertise that security produces, and a gatekeeper connecting the wider quantum ecosystem: computers, sensors, and secure links. Furthermore, the experience operators gain from securing and testing quantum technologies within their own networks can become the foundation for managed services, stronger enterprise relationships and a strategically important role in future quantum infrastructure.
The Migration Burden That Arrives Before The Revenue
Cryptography runs through a telecom network like a distributed material, embedded in network equipment, SIM cards, subscriber authentication, roaming systems and millions of connected devices. Replacing it is closer to a multiyear network upgrade than a software patch, because equipment installed today will still be carrying traffic when quantum-resistant security stops being optional.
In the UK, that is already the case. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre has already set clear target dates for organisations to follow, asking organisations to complete cryptographic discovery by 2028, finish high-priority migration by 2031 and complete the transition by 2035. Operators must find where vulnerable cryptography sits, map their dependencies on equipment vendors and rank systems by the sensitivity and shelf life of the data they protect. All of that spending lands before substantial commercial revenue flows in for quantum-safe connectivity, which poses an uncomfortable sequence for a capital-intensive telecoms industry. The compensation is that clearer visibility of cryptographic assets and more adaptable security systems pay the programme back in conventional resilience long before the quantum threat arrives.
Turning Migration Experience Into A Managed Security Business
Conventional resilience is only the internal half of that return, since what operators learn defending their own estates becomes something they can sell. Governments, banks and critical infrastructure are already established buyers of secure connectivity and hold sensitive data that must stay confidential for decades. BT was one of the first telecom operators to test how quantum security could fit into that market. Through the quantum-secured metro network BT built with Toshiba in London, EY became its first commercial customer in 2021, followed by HSBC as its first banking customer, with the links monitored from BT's own operations centre. Toshiba supplied the quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware, a secure communication method that uses the principles of quantum mechanics to share cryptographic keys, and key management software. That shows where the operator can capture value: packaging the quantum hardware into a managed connectivity service and owning the customer relationship.
That distinction matters because QKD on its own merely distributes cryptographic keys. It does not encrypt the underlying data, authenticate users or secure devices and applications. This creates an opportunity for operators to offer an integrated, saleable proposition. The offering becomes the QKD with the managed service wrapped around it, combining fibre, post-quantum cryptography, encryption, authentication and monitoring under one agreement that quantum specialists may struggle to assemble at national scale.
Operators are becoming early adopters as well as suppliers. Telstra, an investor in Silicon Quantum Computing (SQC), a Firgun Ventures portfolio company, tested whether SQC’s Watermelon could forecast network performance. Using real network data, Telstra reported comparable accuracy after a few days of training and fine-tuning, rather than the weeks required by its classical deep learning model, without needing GPUs for the trial. AT&T took a further step in July 2026, signing an agreement to expand its use of D-Wave technology after an early application reduced one network optimisation workload from approximately an hour to under 15 seconds. These examples suggest that operators could use their proprietary data and operational problems to develop quantum expertise. A logical next step is to package successful methods into services for other customers. Their access to real infrastructure gives them an advantage that outside software vendors would struggle to replicate without an operator partnership.
From Fibre Owner To Orchestrator Of Hybrid Quantum Networks
The longer-horizon role is where operators could provide the infrastructure needed to connect quantum technologies. A general-purpose quantum network could link processors, memories and sensors across different locations, supporting applications ranging from distributed computing to coordinated sensing. What is being built is not a separate quantum internet beside the existing one. Rather, it consists of quantum links running inside ordinary networking, with conventional infrastructure still handling control, authentication and everything the customer touches, as covered in detail in our Firgun Ventures Insights Series piece: “The Quantum Internet: A Relay With No Single Leader”.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has explored this architecture since 2024 through its Quantum-Augmented Network (QuANET) programme, where a 2025 demonstration involved a mixed network in which the time to send a message fell from five minutes to under a millisecond. Commercial hardware is moving in a similar direction. Qunnect, a quantum networks startup, and Monarch Quantum, an integrated photonics company, partnered in August 2026 to build smaller, manufacturable versions of Qunnect's Carina system. The Carina system distributes entanglement, a unique quantum phenomenon which links particles regardless of distance, across ordinary telecom fibre. DARPA awarded Qunnect a contract the same month to improve how those fragile signals survive in field fibre, where environmental changes degrade them.
Owning fibre does not automatically mean owning the most valuable part of the market. Early quantum network access is already being sold, though the control software that allocates hardware, routes traffic, and delivers the customer-facing service tends to come from quantum specialists rather than from the owner of the fibre underneath. Orchestration is where the margin is likely to sit, since it is what lets a customer buy a reliable service without understanding the technology. Whether operators or those specialists end up holding that layer is still open.
What Operators Must Own To Capture The Value
The three roles arrive on different timelines, which is the central consideration for operators allocating capital against them. Security obligations are immediate, managed services are a nearer-term opportunity, and large-scale quantum networking remains a relatively longer-horizon possibility. Therefore, capital has to be committed before standards and revenue models settle. The investment compounds if operators treat it as one programme with three phases rather than three separate businesses.
The familiar risk from the emergence of the internet is that operators fund capital-intensive connectivity while hardware, software and security companies capture the higher-margin services above it. Avoiding that means operators should decide early which layers to own, which to build with partners and which standards to help write. Telecom operators will be pulled into quantum whether or not they choose to lead it. Whether they treat it as another mandatory technology upgrade or use it to strengthen their position in the digital economy remains to be seen.
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